Mahdi Azouz writes in the Al-Jazeera Arabic website, reflecting on the shifting dynamics of the war, noting how the resistance has disrupted Israel’s once formidable military force and shattered the myth of its invincibility.
Editor’s Note: The phrase “الذراع اليابسة” has multiple interpretations, and in this context, it can be translated as “Iron Fist,” “Unyielding Arm,” “Barren Arm,” or “Dry Arm,” reflecting the assumed strength and resilience attributed to the Israeli military.
The tactics of Palestinian resistance have evolved after more than a year of constant confrontation with the occupying forces. With every new phase, the resistance diversifies its methods of attack. In the last week of December, the intifada saw the rise of stabbing attacks, breaches, and suicide bombings, along with the traditional tactics that have accompanied the battle since the beginning of the aggression.
The northern Gaza Strip, which the “generals’ plan” turned into scorched earth, was transformed by the resistance into a “snake-hunting” ground. The blessed land will not betray its people. Abu Obeida briefly appeared to give the assessment of the battle, praising the “inspiring heroism of the resistance fighters” for the entire free world to witness and challenging the enemy to reveal its losses.
The occupation’s army is no longer able to decisively win battles as it once did. The quick victories it once enjoyed have been stripped of their conditions, leaving only their historical memory. The resistance was born to deter “deterrence” and to defeat the “invincible” army.
The “Dry Arm”
The term “Dry Arm” is a translation of the Hebrew phrase “Zroa Yavishah,” which refers to the occupation’s army, symbolizing its previous victorious encounters with Arab armies, which were often easily broken.
From the Nakba of 1948 to the defeat of June 1967, the Israeli army had been able to win its rapid wars. However, the resistance has proven that the “Dry Arm” can be broken. This is one of the undeniable facts of the ongoing struggle.
It is well-known that the Zionist project is a “settler-colonial” project, founded through the ability to circumvent international resolutions and maintain a state of militarization. It is no coincidence that the establishment of the Israeli state coincided with the declaration of the temporary government’s head, David Ben Gurion, about the birth of the Israeli army on May 26, 1948. This synchronization proved that the military was the backbone of the Zionist project and that violence is an inherent and defining feature of the newly created state.
Herzl described Zionism as a “colonial idea,” which is why the Israeli army carries the characteristics of colonial armies in its structure, ideology, and combat performance, implementing colonial methods to subjugate peoples.
It is no surprise that the Israeli army was founded from the ashes of the British Mandate in Palestine and from the smoke of the 1948 conflict between the Arabs and Zionist militias. When we add the settler aspect of the Zionist project, we understand the nature of militarization.
Settler societies, by their very nature, are militarized, as “the settler myth can only be realized through the use of force.” In the face of constant security concerns and perceived threats, the Israeli state maintains a high state of readiness for deterrence, along with continuous mobilization, adding to the militarization of both the state and society. This has given birth to the concept of the “armed nation,” as Israelis refer to themselves.
Thus, over more than seven decades, Israel has established one of the world’s most professional and powerful militaries, ensuring the existence of the state. During its conflicts with Arab armies, Israel was the dominant force in initiating and ending battles.
Past Conflicts
The first rounds of the Arab-Zionist conflict came with the end of the British Mandate in 1947. Zionist militias fought against the weak Arab armies in a war the Zionists called the “War of Independence,” though it was in fact the Nakba. Despite the harshness of the Nakba, history remembers some Arab military figures with honor, such as the martyr Abdul Qadir al-Husseini.
The Zionist militias defeated the regular Arab armies through military operations and international conspiracies. The state of Israel emerged as the price for these victories. Thus, 1948 became viewed as a “sacred year,” the “foundational source” of the state. The militias later evolved into the “Defense Forces.”
It was the first army in history to spring from killing and destruction gangs. The ethics of the newly-formed army naturally mirrored those of the defeated militias, and the “military conduct of Israeli soldiers in the 1948 battlefield became a model for future generations,” as Noam Chomsky noted. For Arabs, this war was a violent shock that “upended many political and intellectual certainties, replacing them with new ones.”
Barely had the Arabs begun to recover from the Nakba when the June 1967 defeat struck, marking another painful chapter of accumulated defeats. In a matter of days, Arabs suffered a crushing loss.
The Israeli “blitzkrieg” on June 5, 1967, knocked Egyptian air forces out of action, as well as those on the Jordanian and Syrian fronts. By the end of the war, the Israeli army had seized new territories: Egypt lost Sinai and Gaza, Jordan lost the West Bank and Jerusalem, and Syria lost the Golan Heights, thus deepening Israel’s strategic position.
That tragic event dramatically shifted the Arab psyche, embedding a constant sense of defeat. The Arab intelligence state collapsed, along with its social democracy. The defeat became the objective equivalent of a repressive Arab state and its humiliated citizens. Through these easy victories, the Israeli army gained a reputation as the “invincible army.”
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Combat Doctrine
Despite the partial victory in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israelis continued to control the battlefield initiative. The security doctrine of the Israeli state was shaped by the two prior defeats, focusing on “enhancing deterrence, strategic warning, and the speed of decision-making.”
However, after the 2006 Lebanon War, Israeli revisions acknowledged the end of conventional wars. Today, limited and asymmetrical confrontations with non-state organizations (such as Hezbollah and Hamas) have become the norm, reducing the significance of wars between states.
Nevertheless, these defeats and disasters sparked a debate over state and politics in the Arab world. Ideological clashes over freedom, liberation, resistance, and recovery from defeat ensued, giving rise to new approaches in managing the conflict.
Al-Aqsa Flood
Since the Second Intifada, the military confrontation has shifted from state armies to non-state organizations, from conventional wars to asymmetrical warfare.
Gaza, in particular, has witnessed numerous rounds of conflict. From 2008 to 2023, several battles occurred, including “Operation Cast Lead” in 2008, “Operation Pillar of Defense” in 2012, “Operation Protective Edge” in 2014, and “Operation Guardian of the Walls” in 2021. The most recent (Palestinian) operation, known as “The Flood,” encapsulated this shift. Through this cumulative resistance, the spirit of defiance continued to grow.
Despite the vast imbalance in power, the resistance managed to combine military effectiveness, intelligence awareness, and unprecedented knowledge of the enemy, making planning and execution easier.
When the resistance initiated a surprise attack, it denied the Israeli army the advantage of the first strike. The enemy was confronted on land, sea, and air. The resistance killed, captured, displaced, and seized territory, engaging in fierce battles across Gaza’s border cities, leading to paralysis within the Israeli army. When Israel tried to regain initiative, the resistance had already outpaced them.
The ground war was no less harsh on the Israelis. The Israeli army entered the war in a state of moral collapse. Faced with intelligence failure, it was unable to build successful military operations and got bogged down in Gaza’s quicksand. When the two sides met in battle, every Gaza city was like a state with its own army. Gaza itself became a blazing land.
The resistance fighter appeared suddenly, and carried out attacks with missiles, explosives, or mines, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy before disappearing. In all this, the resistance deprived the occupier of achieving its objectives.
When it came to objectives, the resistance was more realistic. Netanyahu’s goals were lost as the war on Gaza proved “a war that cannot be won.” Meanwhile, “The Flood” was able to discredit the occupation’s narrative, end its political campaign of historical victimhood, and halt the decline of the Arab world. Most importantly, it broke the “Dry Arm.”
(The views expressed in the article do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Palestine Chronicle.)
Opinions that are disconnected from reality are the main cause of the sad and long-standing defeat of the Palestinians. Because the truth is that the Zionists wiped out their own ground force and relied on stupid technology. Therefore, there was no breaking of the ground arm. Because it did not exist. They learned a lesson and are now building a large ground force. They destroyed Gaza. And the reporter probably doesn’t know what the generals’ plan is because they haven’t done it yet. If Trump comes in and they do it, it will be a disaster.